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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE ROLE OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT IN FIRE INVESTIGATIONS-Michigan v. Clifford,
_ U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984).
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the ap-
plicability of the fourth amendment's warrant clause to govern-
ment officials who are attempting to determine the cause and ori-
gin of fires. The Court first addressed this issue in Michigan v.
Tyler.1 In that case, the Court held that the fire itself was an "exi-
gent circumstance" justifying a warrantless entry and that firemen
could then remain on the premises for a reasonable time to investi-
gate the cause of the fire.
In decisions subsequent to Tyler,2 lower courts have encoun-
tered difficulties in applying the precepts enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in that case. In Michigan v. Clifford,' the Court
"granted certiorari to clarify doubt that appear[ed] to exist as to
the application of [its] decision in Tyler.' '4 This note will attempt
to determine whether the Court was successful in clarifying the
doubt concerning the application of the precepts stated in Tyler,
or whether the Court may have sown new seeds of confusion in this
area.
THE CASE
In the early morning hours of October 18, 1980, a fire began in
Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford's home while they were out of
town. The Detroit Fire Department responded to the fire arriving
on the scene at about 5:42 a.m. All fire officials and police left the
premises at 7:04 a.m. after extinguishing the fire.5 At 8:00 a.m. on
the morning of the fire, a fire investigator was informed that the
fire department suspected arson, and he was instructed to investi-
gate the Clifford fire. Due to other assignments, the investigator,
1. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
2. See e.g., Cleaver v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 29 Cal. 3d 297,
594 P.2d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1979); United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117
(1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1978).
3. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 641 (1984).
4. 104 S. Ct. at 645.
5. Id.
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Lieutenant Beyer, did not arrive at the scene of the fire until about
1:00 p.m. that same day.
Upon arrival, the investigator and his partner found a work
crew pumping water out of the basement and boarding up the Clif-
ford residence. A neighbor, who had informed the Cliffords of the
fire, advised the investigators that the Cliffords did not plan to re-
turn that day and that Clifford had instructed the neighbor to re-
quest the insurance company to send out a crew to secure the
house. While waiting for the crew to pump water out of the base-
ment, Lieutenant Beyer discovered a Coleman fuel can in the
driveway.6 He seized the can and marked it as evidence.
At 1:30 p.m. Lieutenant Beyer and his partner entered the
Clifford home and began their investigation into the cause of the
fire. They had not obtained the Cliffords' consent or an adminis-
trative warrant. The investigators conducted an extensive search
that began in the basement where they found two Coleman fuel
cans and a crock pot attached to an electrical timer.7 The investi-
gators determined that the fire had been set deliberately by use of
the crock pot and timer. They then extended their search to the
upper portions of the house where they found additional evidence
of arson. All of this evidence was seized and marked.'
Respondents, Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford, were ar-
rested and charged with arson based upon the investigation of the
scene and the evidence discovered during the search. At the proba-
ble cause hearing, the State introduced the physical evidence
seized by Lieutenant Beyer and his partner during the October 18
search of the Clifford residence. The respondents moved to sup-
press the evidence on the ground that it was obtained through a
warrantless and nonconsensual search of their home and therefore
violated their rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court de-
nied the motion and bound the respondents over for trial. Prior to
trial, the respondents again moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained during the October 18 search. The trial court denied the
6. Id. The firefighters initially on the scene had discovered the can in the
basement and placed it in the driveway.
7. Id. These items were found in debris beneath the stairway. The timer was
plugged into a nearby wall outlet. It was set to turn on at 3:45 a.m. and turn off at
9:00 a.m. The timer had stopped between 4:00 and 4:30 a.m.
8. Id. Upstairs the investigator found the drawers and closets full of old
clothes. There were nails on the walls but no pictures. There were wires for a
video tape machine but no machine.
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motion on the ground that "exigent circumstances" justified the
warrantless search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and
held that there were no "exigent circumstances" justifying the
search.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
clarify doubt it felt existed as to the application of its decision in
Tyler.10
In its petition for certiorari, the State asked the Court to ex-
empt all administrative investigations into the cause and origin of
fires from the warrant requirement. The respondents argued that
since the searches were to gather evidence of arson and were con-
ducted without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, they
were per se unreasonable under the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments. In a five-four decision, the majority of the justices refused
to sanction the search of the basement. The majority pointed out
that while a fire creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless en-
try by firemen, once the fire has been extinguished and the firemen
have left, the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy
that requires a warrant before a further search may be made."
BACKGROUND
The primary purpose of the fourth amendment" is to safe-
guard the privacy of individuals against arbitrary and unreasona-
ble searches and seizures by the government. There has been con-
siderable confusion concerning the application of the fourth
amendment to inspections made by administrative agencies. The
confusion centers on when and under what circumstances a statute
can legally authorize warrantless inspections.
Twenty-one years ago the Supreme Court first addressed the
9. The Court of appeals found that the warrantless entry and search of the
Clifford residence was conducted pursuant to a policy of the Detroit Fire Depart-
ment. The department sanctioned such searches as long as the owner was not
present, the premises were open to trespass and the search occurred within a rea-
sonable time of the fire. The court of appeals held that that policy was inconsis-
tent with Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), and therefore the nonconsen-
sual, warrantless search violated the Cliffords' fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights. Id. at 644, 645.
10. Id. at 645.
11. Id. at 646-47.
12. U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
1984]
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constitutionality of warrantless administrative inspections in
Frank v. Maryland.3 The city health code involved in Frank au-
thorized inspections without requiring that the inspector obtain a.
warrant. 4 The homeowner in Frank refused to consent to an in-
spection of his home for possible violations of the city health code
by an inspector who did not have a warrant. 5
A combination of four factors led the Court, in Frank, to hold
that certain warrantless administrative inspections were constitu-
tionally proper."8 First, the Court felt that since the fourth amend-
ment was adopted to restrain public officials in their search for
criminal violations, its protection could not be invoked where the
purpose of the inspection was merely to determine the existence of
health code violations and not to gather evidence of criminal activ-
ity.' 7 Second, the health code's grant of the power of inspection
was strictly limited and contained safeguards which eliminated all
but the slightest restrictions on claims of privacy.' 8 Third, the
Court felt there was a significant governmental interest in main-
taining minimum health standards.' Fourth, the Court felt the ap-
plication of the warrant requirement in this situation would se-
verely curtail proper enforcement of the health code.2"
Eight years later, in Camara v. Municipal Court," the Su-
preme Court overruled Frank and held that under ordinary cir-
cumstances, searches by administrative agencies must be con-
ducted pursuant to a search warrant. In the companion case of See
v. Seattle,22 the Court held this fourth amendment protection ap-
plied to searches of commercial as well as residential property.
In Camara, the Court abandoned three of the four factors it
considered crucial to the decision in Frank. The majority consid-
ered it irrelevant whether evidence of a criminal nature was sought
13. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). The decision was overruled in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
14. 359 U.S. at 361.
15. Id. The city health code authorized the imposition of fines for refusal to
permit inspections.
16. Id. at 373.
17. Id. at 363-66.
18. Id. at 367. For example, the Code prohibited forcible entries, allowed
only daytime inspections, and required valid grounds for suspicion of the exis-
tence of a nuisance.
19. Id. at 371-72.
20. Id. at 372. "
21. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
22. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
272 [Vol. 7:269
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as opposed to evidence of violations of civil codes or local regula-
tory ordinances.23 The Court held that the broad statutory safe-
guards were no substitute for the individualized review provided
by the magistrate in the warrant process.24 Also, the Court felt the
emphasis placed on the government's interest was overblown in
Frank. The Court held that the question was "whether the author-
ity to search should be evidenced by a warrant," not whether the
public interest justified the type of search in question.25 Whether
the authority to search should be conducted pursuant to a warrant
would partly depend upon whether the governmental purpose be-
hind the search would be frustrated by the burden of obtaining a
warrant.26 In See, the Court reserved for future determination the
question of what other searches by administrative agencies could
be conducted without warrants.
Three years later, in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States,27 the Court carved an exception in See's general rule re-
quiring a warrant for administrative inspections of commercial
premises. Noting the long history of governmental regulation of
the liquor industry, in Colonnade, the Court held that the warrant
requirement of See was not applicable.2 Just two years after Col-
onnade, the Court upheld the constitutionality of warrantless in-
spections in the firearms industry in United States v. Biswell.2 9
The Court in that case considered pivotal the fact that a warrant
requirement could have easily frustrated enforcement of the regu-
23. 387 U.S. at 530. The Court agreed that inspections under local regulatory
ordinances were less hostile than typical searches for evidence of criminal activity.
But the Court felt it would be an anomaly to hold that an individual could receive
the full protection of the fourth amendment only if the individual was suspected
of criminal behavior.
24. Id. at 533.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). The case involved a caterer licensed to serve alcoholic
beverages who refused to allow Federal Internal Revenue Service agents to search
his locked storeroom absent a warrant.
28. Id. at 77. The court in Colonnade stressed the broad authority of Con-
gress to set standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures. The necessity
of warrantless searches to insure effective enforcement of regulations was not
mentioned, though the issue was considered determinative in the Camara deci-
sion. 387 U.S. at 533.
29. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). The case involved the attempt to suppress criminal
evidence seized by a Federal Treasury agent during a warrantless search of the
premises of a dealer federally licensed to sell firearms.
1984]
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latory scheme."
In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 1 the Court held a provision of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA),3" al-
lowing warrantless inspections, unconstitutional. The Court stated
the electrical and plumbing installation business was not so perva-
sively regulated as to qualify for the "pervasive regulation" excep-
tion stated in Biswell. The Court held that the warrant require-
ment would not place a burden on the enforcement of OSHA and
would protect the reasonable expectations of individual privacy.34
In Michigan v. Tyler3 5 the question of warrantless searches
arose in another area, that of fire investigation. It is generally ac-
cepted that a governmental official will investigate the scene of a
fire in order to determine the cause of the blaze. The official could
be a member of the local fire or police department. The time and
scope of these investigations may vary; they may occur at the time
of the fire, shortly thereafter, or even days later depending on the
department involved, its particular policy and its work load.36
Often a state statute or local ordinance will permit warrantless
searches of a fire scene and allow on site inspections.3 7 The ,appel-
late decisions in this area have generally held that such inspections
comply with fourth amendment requirements even though con-
ducted without warrants and without probable cause to believe the
fire was of criminal origin.33
In Michigan v. Tyler,3 9 the Court upheld a Michigan Supreme
Court reversal of an arson conviction based on evidence obtained
by police and fire officials who visited the scene of the fire without
a warrant. In Tyler, fire officials discovered plastic containers of
30. Id. at 317. Biswell ignored the significance of the history of government
regulation of the industry involved. Instead, the Court considered a combination
of three factors in concluding the warrantless inspections were constitutionally
permissible-the enforcement needs of the statute, the magnitude of the govern-
mental interest, and the threats to privacy.
31. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
33. 436 U.S. at 313.
34. Id. at 324-25.
35. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
36. 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.4 (1982).
37. Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
38. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Green,
474 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1973); People v. Bailey, 42 Mich. App. 359, 202 N.W.2d
557 (1972); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 863, 188 S.E.2d 215 (1972).
39. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
274 [Vol. 7:269
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flammable liquid inside a fire-damaged furniture store shortly after
the local fire department arrived.40 A police detective was sum-
moned to investigate the possibility of arson. The detective and
fire officials arrived before the firefighters departed, but left the
premises before completing the investigation because of smoke and
steam in the building. Returning four hours after the fire was ex-
tinguished and after the firefighters had departed, the officials con-
ducted a cursory examination, then left the scene.41 Joined by the
detective, the fire officials returned approximately an hour later,
reexamined the premises and removed pieces of evidence.42 The
fire officials entered the fire-damaged store to seize evidence on at
least three other occasions: once four days, once seven days, and
once twenty-five days after the fire. 43 The United States Supreme
Court held that the evidence seized during the initial entry was
proper. The Court held the re-entries on the morning of the fire
were "continuations" of the initial entry, therefore the evidence
seized during those searches was also properly admissible. 4" The
Court held the evidence seized in the re-entries occurring after the
day of the fire inadmissible. 5
ANALYSIS
The majority in Clifford stated that the issue involved was the
extent of an arson investigator's authority, in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances, a warrant, or consent, to enter a private resi-
dence to investigate the cause of a recent fire. 46 In the opinion au-
thored by Justice Powell, 7 the majority held "that a subsequent
post-fire search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, consent,
or the identification of some new exigency. '48 An administrative
warrant would be sufficient so long as the purpose of the search
was to ascertain the cause of the fire. 49 The majority restated its
holding in Tyler that the nonconsensual entry and search of prop-
erty is governed by the warrant requirement of the fourth and
40. Id. at 501-02.
41. Id. at 502.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 503.
44. Id. at 511.
45. Id.
46. 104 S. Ct. at 644.
47. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined the majority opinion.
48. 104 S. Ct. at 648-49.
49. Id. at 649.
1984]
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fourteenth amendments except in a carefully defined class of
cases.
50
The Court outlined three factors it felt were crucial to the
analysis of cases in this area. First, "whether there are legitimate
privacy interests in the fire-damaged property that are protected
by the Fourth Amendment." Second, whether the governmental
intrusion could be justified by exigent circumstances without re-
gard to reasonable expectations of privacy. Last, whether the
search is to gather evidence of criminal activity or is only to deter-
mine the cause of the fire. 1
The majority noted that the State did not claim that the post-
fire searches were justified by exigent circumstances. 2 Without
discussion, the majority rejected the State's argument that post-
fire searches should be altogether exempt from the warrant re-
quirement." The majority then proceeded to distinguish the facts
before it from those of Tyler and refused to modify Tyler to justify
the search in this case.54 First, the majority found the re-entry in
Clifford was distinguishable from that in Tyler because of the in-
terim efforts the Cliffords had taken to secure their home. The ma-
jority stated that those efforts served to separate the entry to ex-
tinguish the fire from the re-entry to investigate the cause of the
fire. Second, the majority stated there were greater privacy inter-
ests associated with the private residence in Clifford than those
interests involved in the commercial structure in Tyler.55 Thus, af-
ter distinguishing Tyler, the majority affirmed that portion of the
Michigan Court of Appeals decision which excluded the evidence."
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, but rendered a
separate opinion. Justice Stevens stated that the Justices agreed
on three general propositions regarding the protection the owner of
fire damaged premises received from the fourth amendment. Jus-
tice Stevens felt there was no disagreement within the Court con-
cerning the "right of the firefighters to make a forceful, unan-
50. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
51. 104 S. Ct. at 646.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 648-49.
55. Id. at 648.
56. Id. at 649-50. It should be noted that the can found in the driveway was
still considered admissible evidence because it had been discovered in the "plain
view" of firefighters who initially responded to the blaze.
[Vol. 7:269276
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nounced, nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a burning
building."57 The Court agreed on the firemen's right to remain on
the premises to extinguish the fire, satisfy themselves that there
was no danger of rekindling, and to investigate the origin of the
fire.58 Justice Stevens stated there was also unanimity within the
Court that after investigators determine the cause and origin of the
fire, any further search of other portions of the premises may only
be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause.59
Justice Stevens stated that the issues that divided the Court
in Clifford were whether the re-entry by Lieutenant Beyer should
be regarded as a continuation of the earlier search and whether a
warrantless, nonconsensual, post-fire investigation is constitu-
tional.60 Presumably, Justice Stevens would hold that once the fire
justifying the initial entry is extinguished and the firemen have left
the premises, the emergency is over; therefore, re-entry must be
made pursuant to a warrant." Justice Stevens stated that a war-
rantless search may have been constitutionally permissible if inves-
tigators had either given the owners sufficient advance notice to
enable them or their agent to be present or had made a reasonable
effort to do so.62 Justice Stevens concluded that the search in Clif-
ford violated the fourth amendment because the investigators
failed to provide fair notice of the inspection to the owners of the
premises.6 3 Justice Stevens' vote determined the outcome in Clif-
ford, and this presents an interesting point. If the investigators
had attempted to notify the Cliffords of the search or if the Clif-
fords had been present, Justice Stevens may have found the search
reasonable, and thus the outcome of the case would have been
different."
The dissent by Justice Rehnquist 5 argued that the re-entry
by Lieutenant Beyer six hours later was an "actual continuation"
of the original entry to extinguish the blaze and would have been a
57. Id. at 650.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 651.
62. Id. at 652.
63. Id. at 653.
64. Note, Recent Development: Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure, 11
AM. J. CRIM. LAW 387, 391 (1983).
65. 104 S. Ct. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor.).
1984]
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valid search authorized by Tyler. Justice Rehnquist stated that be-
cause the justification for the search was the fire, an event which
the investigators did not control, application of the warrant re-
quirement would not serve a valid purpose, because its purpose is
only to protect individuals from the unbridled discretion of gov-
ernment officials. 60
The grounds the majority relied on in distinguishing the facts
in Clifford from those in Tyler were faulty. The majority stated
that the Cliffords' efforts to secure the privacy interests that re-
mained in their residence served to separate the entry made to ex-
tinguish the blaze from the later entry to investigate the fire.6 The
Court stated in Tyler that "[1]ittle purpose would have been
served by [the firemen] remaining in the building, except to re-
move any doubt about the legality of the warrantless search and
seizure.later that same morning. ' '6 8 Such a statement suggested
that such artificial acts would not be necessary if the search were
made within a reasonable time. The constitutionality of subse-
quent post-fire searches should not depend on such artificial acts
as an owner's attempts to secure the remains of his fire-damaged
premises. In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist aptly pointed out fur-
ther failure of the majority's logic. While the Cliffords' interim ef-
forts to secure their home "may go to the question of whether or
not there was an invasion of a privacy interest amounting to a
search, it has no bearing on the question of whether there were
exigent circumstances which constitute an exception to the war-
rant requirement ... "
The Court's logic is also erroneous in holding that higher pri-
vacy interests exist in personal residences than in commercial
premises. Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent that "[ilt is
also well-established that private commercial buildings in this con-
text are as much protected by the Fourth Amendment as are pri-
vate dwellings. '7 0 Justice Rehnquist was correct when he pointed
out that the majority distinguished Clifford from Tyler on "trivial
and immaterial" differences. 71
Although Clifford reaffirmed the essential requirements con-
cerning fire investigations as stated in Tyler, Justice Rehnquist is
66. Id. at 655.
67. Id. at 648.
68. 436 U.S. at 511.
69. 104 S. Ct. at 654.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 653.
[Vol. 7:269
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 8
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss2/8
SEARCH WARRANTS
well-founded in stating that Clifford has served to confuse rather
than clarify the ambiguities of Tyler. 2 In Clifford, the Court af-
firmed its holding in Tyler that once firefighters enter premises to
extinguish a fire they may remain for a "reasonable time" to deter-
mine the origin and cause of the fire. 3 The problem arises as to
the determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time to inves-
tigate." What constitutes a reasonable time will have to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis taking numerous factors into ac-
count. In such an analysis, courts will need to consider such factors
as: the different fires and the diverse policies of investigating de-
partments;74 the fact that fires engulfing several buildings or large
apartment complexes present more complexities than fires in sin-
gle family dwellings;75 and, that the investigating officials may have
more than one fire to investigate on the same day.76
The determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" as
enunciated in Tyler has provided courts with some difficulty. For
example, the Alaska Supreme Court, in Schultz v. State,7 7 upheld
a fire inspector's warrantless search and seizure. In Schultz, the
fire inspector arrived at the scene when the fire was under control
but not yet extinguished.7 ' The investigator entered "solely for the
purpose of ascertaining the cause of the fire" and remained on the
premises for over an hour taking pictures and seizing items of evi-
dence.79 In determining whether the inspector's search occurred
within a reasonable time, the court relied on the balancing test
enunciated in Tyler. 0 Applying that test, the court found the de-
fendant's argument without merit. The defendant argued that
Tyler, which dealt primarily with firefighters remaining on the
premises, was not distinguishable from Schultz where the inspec-
tors entered the premises after the fire was under control. The
court stated that the overriding concern in both cases was discov-
ering the cause of the fire.81 Schultz reveals the difficulty of bal-
ancing the public interest of a speedy, unimpeded, arson investiga-
72. Id.
73. 104 S. Ct. at 646-47; 436 U.S. at 511.
74. 436 U.S. at 510 n. 6.
75. Id.
76. 104 S. Ct. at 655 n. 1.
77. 593 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1979).
78. Id. at 641.
79. Id. at 642.
80. Id. at 642-43.
81. Id. at 643.
1984] 279
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tion against the individual's "reasonable expectations of privacy. '82
Despite the difficulties encountered by lower courts in the ap-
plication of the Tyler "reasonable time" test, the United States
Supreme Court once again applied that vague test in Clifford. Such
a vague test is of little help to the fire official in making his split
second decision whether to obtain a warrant; because what was
reasonable at the fire scene may not seem reasonable to the review-
ing court which has the benefit of hindsight. 3
The holding by the Court, in Clifford, seems to indicate that
in the future, any investigation made after the initial firefighting
crew departs should be made pursuant to an administrative war-
rant. That rule should hold true unless the re-entry could be
placed within that small category of circumstances where it could
be considered a "continuation" of the initial exigency or if a new
exigency had arisen. A possible exigency justifying a warrantless
search was noted by the Court in Tyler. "Immediate investigation
may also be necessary to preserve evidence from intentional or ac-
cidental destruction. 8 4 Although the State failed to argue the
point, that exigency may have been present in Clifford. Arguably,
the presence of the work crew in the basement presented the dan-
ger that possible evidence could have been destroyed. The Court
failed to address that possible exigency in Clifford.
One commentator noted a question left unanswered by
Tyler.8 5 The Court failed to address the extent to which an admin-
istrative search warrant can be used in cases where the suspicion of
criminal activity does not rise to the level of probable cause.8, Clif-
ford seems to provide only a partial answer. "[T]he object of the
search determines the type of warrant required. '87 An administra-
82. United States v. Molt, 589 F.2d 1247, 1254 (3d Cir. 1978) (Stern, J., dis-
senting opinion).
83. Id. at 1255.
84. 436 U.S. at 510.
85. Note, Searches By Administrative Agencies After Barlow's and Tyler:
Fourth Amendment Pitfalls and Short-Cuts, 14 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 207
(1979).
86. Id. at 223.
87. 104 S. Ct. at 647:
If the primary object [of the search] is to determine the cause and
origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice ....
If the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal
activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained only on a showing of
probable cause to believe that relevant evidence will be found in the
place to be searched."
280 [Vol. 7:269
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tive warrant will suffice for investigations into the cause and origin
of the fire. Under the "plain view" doctrine, evidence of criminal
activity found during the course of an administrative search may
be validly seized. 88 Evidence seized during the course of the admin-
istrative search "may be used to establish probable cause to obtain
a criminal search warrant."8 9 However, such evidence cannot be
used to expand the scope of an administrative search. A criminal
search warrant must first be obtained.90
The Court's analysis in Clifford is incomplete. The Court
failed to address what steps fire officials should take once evidence
of a criminal nature is found during an administrative search. The
Court also neglected to state any criteria as to the amount and
scope of evidence needed to obtain a criminal warrant based on
probable cause. Absent such guidelines, fire officials in the field are
left to guess as to the sufficiency of their evidence, and as to what
point in the investigation to obtain a criminal warrant.
In Clifford, the Court would have done well to have adopted
the standard enunciated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Michi-
gan v. Tyler.91 That court held that after the initial entry to extin-
guish a fire, all post-fire warrantless searches were unconstitutional
and evidence obtained during such searches should be excluded.92
This would have provided a clear line of demarcation and an easier
standard for fire officials to apply. The Court's failure to establish
an understandable standard will increase the probability that evi-
dence of arson will be excluded from trial. In the future, prudent
investigators will do well to obtain an administrative warrant prior
to any investigation conducted after the departure of the initial
fire-fighting crew.
CONCLUSION
In Clifford, the United States Supreme Court attempted to
clarify existing doubts regarding the application of the Tyler
precepts concerning search warrants in fire investigations. Due to a
fire investigation's potential dual nature-both administrative and
criminal-the search warrant requirements needed clarification.
Although Clifford reaffirmed the essential requirements concerning
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Michigan v. Tyler, 399 Mich. 564, 250 N.W.2d 467 (1977).
92. Id. at - 250 N.W.2d at 477.
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fire investigations as stated in Tyler, the Court has sown new seeds
of confusion in the area.
In Clifford, the Court made it clear that the initial entry to
fight a fire does not require a warrant and that officials may re-
main on the premises for a reasonable time to investigate the cause
of the blaze. Any "subsequent post-fire search[es] must be con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant, consent, or the identification of
some new exigency." 98 Post-fire re-entries will almost always re-
quire at least an administrative warrant, unless it fits within the
Tyler circumstances where the re-entry is considered an "actual
continuation" of the initial exigency. Evidence of criminal activity
found in plain view during the course of an administrative search
may be validly seized. Evidence seized during the course of the ad-
ministrative search may be used to establish probable cause to ob-
tain a criminal search warrant. Such evidence, however, cannot be
used to expand the scope of an administrative search. A criminal
warrant must first be obtained. The Clifford Court however, left
unanswered the question of the amount and scope of evidence
needed in order to obtain a criminal warrant based on probable
cause and at what point in the investigation such a warrant should
be obtained. Such a judicial omission makes it necessary for inves-
tigators to obtain at least an administrative warrant for any inves-
tigations conducted after the initial firefighting crew has departed,
or run the risk that evidence found may be excluded from trial.
When fire officials re-enter premises without the owner's con-
sent, or without a warrant, it is uncertain whether the re-entry is
legal. The flexible standard of Tyler, allowing officials to perform
their investigative duties within a "reasonable time," becomes even
more difficult to apply in light of the decision in Clifford. The
Court in Clifford should have held the re-entry by Lieutenant
Beyer to be a "continuation" of the initial exigency. Instead, the
Court chose to distinguish the re-entry in Clifford from that in
Tyler only upon the basis of "trivial and immaterial grounds." 94
Justice Rehnquist aptly summarized Clifford, stating that the
"opinion, far from clarifying the doubtful aspects of Tyler, sows
confusion broadside."95
Samuel A. Mann
93. 104 S. Ct. at 648-49.
94. Id. at 653.
95. Id.
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